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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the long-run relationship among tax evasion,
corruption and different stages of entrepreneurial activities for 31
OECD countries based on a series of annual data during the
period of 2000–2010. The analysis was conducted using Dynamic
Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) and Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS)
approaches. The results clearly suggest the existence of a statistic-
ally significant long-run relationship between Tax evasion, corrup-
tion and entrepreneurial activities. In addition, the findings reveal
that (1) corruption has a negative impact on all three stages of
entrepreneurial motivation, total entrepreneurship activity and
established entrepreneurship, and (2) using the DOLS and FMOLS
estimates, tax evasion has a negative effect on the TEA and estab-
lished entrepreneurship, while it has a positive impact on the
entrepreneurial motivation. Consequently, if entrepreneurship is
one of the main drivers of economic growth, policymakers and
the government should simultaneously adopt policies to combat
corruption and reduce institutional weaknesses when trying to
reduce tax evasion.
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Entrepreneurship as one of the main drivers of economic growth increases the prod-
uctivity and employment (Cullen & Gordon, 2007). A large number of researchers
have pointed out that corruption has a significant and negative impact on the level of
tax revenue collected in a country (Avnimelech, Zelekha, & Sharabi, 2014; Belitski,
Chowdhury, & Desai, 2016; Berdiev & Saunoris, 2018; Nawaz, 2010). Moreover, the
fact that countries with higher levels of corruption have higher levels of underground
economics and therefore higher tax evasion are generally accepted. However, the
existence of tax evasion enhances the environment of corruption. These two phenom-
ena have a negative impact on entrepreneurship and economic growth and discourage
the private sector from innovating and boosting uncertainty in the market.
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Although, several studies investigated how institutional weaknesses affect entrepre-
neurial activities, however, less attention has been paid to tax evasion, corruption,
and their negative impact on entrepreneurial activities in the long run. For example,
Estrin and Mickiewicz (2012) argue that in countries with a larger shadow economy,
the volume and motivation of entrepreneurial activities are lower. Similarly, Parker
(2003) shows that tax evasion influences selection of jobs and entrepreneurial activ-
ities. Anokhin and Schulze (2009) believe that better control of corruption may lead
to higher levels of entrepreneurship. However, none of these articles addresses the
underlying issues in relation to the fact that entrepreneurs may also affect the level of
corruption and tax evasion.
Various studies have shown that entrepreneurs may pay taxes; only in a situation
that their tax loyalty is high, costly tax evasion, and when the risk of foreclosure, cap-
ture and severity of punishment is high (Lisi & Pugno, 2011; Mickiewicz, Rebmann,
& Sauka, 2012). It is worth noting that the mechanism by which entrepreneurs are
tax evasion may be complex. In order to make further explanations in this regard,
the issues of criminal entrepreneurship can be somewhat contributing. In this sense,
entrepreneurship is not always a healthy and clean activity, and can have devastating
dimensions in society as well. In addition, one of a variety of criminal entrepreneur-
ship strategies that entrepreneurs can escape through tax is developing their business
in the underground economy (Williams, 2008).
The case of OECD countries is useful to study primarily because they have for the
most part economies at comparable levels of development; the rates of entrepreneur-
ial activities are significantly different across this countries (see Figure 1).
Considering the importance of tax evasion and corruption in the formation of entre-
preneurial activities, the fundamental question that the present study seeks to answer
is how far tax evasion and corruption can affect the development of entrepreneurial
activities, more specifically, the paper try to answer three questions: (1) How does
average and marginal tax rates affect entrepreneurship in OECD countries. (2) How
does tax progressivity affect entrepreneurship? (3) Are these effects different for dif-










Entrepreneurial Movaon TEA Entrepreneurship
Established Entrepreneurship
Figure 1. Entrepreneurship, tax evasion and corruption in OECD Countries.
3628 M. MOHAMMADI KHYAREH
The empirical analysis in this paper mostly based on the set of standard panel
cointegration tools, such as Pedroni and Kao’s cointegration tests, the Dynamic
Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) and Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS)
estimators. The paper organised in five sections. After the Introduction, Section 2
briefly presents a literature review on the relationship between corruption, tax evasion
and entrepreneurship. The data and methodology discussed in Section 3. Section 4
gives empirical results. Finally, section 5 presented conclusion with policy implica-
tions and possible directions for further research.
2. Literature review
2.1. Entrepreneurship determinants: a brief literature review
The analysis of the literature highlights the existence of a large number of theoretical
and empirical studies that identify the factors with potential impact on the entrepre-
neurship dynamics, either in one country or in a group of countries. Wennekers,
Uhlaner, and Thurik (2002) identify technology, the level of economic development,
demography, culture and institutions as determinants of entrepreneurship.
Comparatively, Giannetti and Simonov (2004) highlight three types of factors, which
would affect entrepreneurial activity, namely: individual characteristics (e.g., salary,
wealth, age, and some demographic characteristic); the economic characteristics of
the area where the individual lives (e.g., income per capita, unemployment rate, etc.),
and; the characteristics of the social environment (religion, social status of entrepre-
neurs, education, etc.).
Several Studies examined the determinants of entrepreneurship at the micro level
focus on the decision making process by individuals’ motivation to become self-
employed (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; Reynolds, Miller, & Maki, 1995). For
instance, personal factors such as psychological traits, formal education and other
skills, as well as financial assets, family background, and previous work experience
are considered aspects that affect individuals’ decisions to become self-employed.
Furthermore, some studies focus on a range of environmental factors, such as techno-
logical, economic, and cultural variables, as well as government regulations (Uhlaner
& Thurik, 2010).
Moreover, determinants of entrepreneurship can also be understood from the so-
called push (i.e., product market), and pull (i.e., labour market) factor perspectives.
Push factors, as technological developments, diversity in consumer demand, the
industrial structure of the economy, government regulation, and the stage of eco-
nomic development. The pull factors are determined by the characteristics of the
population (i.e., demographic characteristics), incomes levels, educational attainment,
the degree of unemployment, cultural norms, and the institutional environment (i.e.,
access to finance, administrative burdens, and the degree of taxation). Fogel, Morck,
and Yeung (2008) and Bjørnskov and Foss (2008) argued that institutional features,
such as the size of the government, the degree of administrative complexity, the tax
environment, the intellectual property rights regime, the level of trust, corruption,
crime, and availability to finance capital could affect the level of entrepreneurship in
a country. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2004) found, for a sample of European
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countries, that bureaucratic regulation inhibits entry. Related empirical studies find
that well-defined rules and regulations, well-protected property rights, sound govern-
ment, less corruption, and an efficient judicial system promote entrepreneurship
(Bosma, Wennekers, de Wit, & Zwinkels, 2000; Desai, Gompers, & Lerner, 2003;
Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002). According to Verheul, Wennekers,
Audretsch, and Thurik (2001) the impact of taxes on the level of entrepreneurship is
complex and even paradoxical. Henriquez, Verheul, Van Der Knaap, and Bischoff
(2001) stated that the level of taxes and the complexity of the tax system negatively
affect the level of entrepreneurship. It is argued that high tax rates erode the income
of small businesses, while complex and opaque tax systems can discourage (potential)
entrepreneurs and keep them from their basic activities.
2.2. A review of theoretical foundations and research background
Tax evasion and corruption historically have always been a general problem with ser-
ious economic consequences not only in developing countries, but also in countries
with advanced tax systems. In general, tax evasion and corruption can have vague
effects on entrepreneurial activity. Tax evasion increases the amount of resources
accumulated by entrepreneurs, but on the other hand, with the reduction of tax reve-
nues collected by the government, the level of public services will be reduced; hence,
it will lead to negative consequences on economic growth. Although both theoretical
and empirical researches have been investigated the origins and causes of the effects
and extent of tax evasion and corruption, but the interrelationships between them
have been limited in scope. Several studies have shown that corruption affects tax
management and the level of tax revenue collected in a country (Nawaz, 2010).
Although some scholars find corruption as a tool to reduce excessive tax burdens
on the economy, tax burden reduction can improve the investment process in soci-
eties through better allocation of resources. However, the dominant view points out
that, in general, both phenomena have a negative effect on the economy and, in par-
ticular, have a negative effect on the level of entrepreneurial activity. Even though the
relationship between tax evasion and entrepreneurship in the theoretical literature is
rarely taken into consideration, however, the impact of taxation on entrepreneurial
activities has been studied extensively. Investigating the entrepreneurship-tax nexus
can be found in the studies of Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer
(2010), Hansson (2012), Baliamoune-Lutz & Garello (2014), Bruce, Liu, and Murray
(2015) and Hopkins (2016).
Taxation can affect the entry of entrepreneurs into entrepreneurial activities in a
variety of ways, such as investment, risk taking and job selection (Asoni & Sanandaji,
2014). Ferede (2013) emphasised the fact that the reverse impact of income tax on
entrepreneurial risk is more important than tax evasion opportunities for self-
employed people. Also, Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2014), using the data of emerg-
ing entrepreneurship from the GEM, taken into account the relationship between tax
structure and entrepreneurship based on data from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). The results of their study showed that
3630 M. MOHAMMADI KHYAREH
progressive taxes on higher- incomes have a negative and significant effect on emerg-
ing entrepreneurship.
2.3. Tax evasion and entrepreneurship
The key element in the attitude of entrepreneurs towards tax evasion is the ‘tax mor-
ale’, which is seen as a moral obligation or an intrinsic motive for tax payments.
Yitzhaki (1974) have emphasised on the role of the risk of arrest or detention and the
severity of the punishment for tax evasion behaviour of entrepreneurs. Unlike tax
evasion, tax morale does not measure individual behaviour, but measures individual
attitudes (Lisi & Pugno, 2011). An analysis of the tax evasion in the literature of tax
compliance goes back to the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) classic essay. Since then,
considerable literature has appeared on corruption and tax evasion. A self-employed
person can easily escape tax payments through reporting little income and not declar-
ing real income. It is the main reason why people, instead of wage earners, take
entrepreneurship (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998). In addition, the structure of
tax policy in a country can affect the tax morale and make tax evasion more attract-
ive (Doerrenberg & Peichl, 2013). Several studies have examined the relationship
between tax and cost of business start-ups on entrepreneurship (Block, 2016;
Braunerhjelm & Eklund, 2014; Cullen & Gordon, 2007). Darnihamedani, Block,
Hessels, and Simonyan (2018) concluded that tax payments would reduce taxpayer
satisfaction and a diminishing income factor. Therefore, they concluded that taxes, in
addition to affecting the strategic decisions of entrepreneurs such as Willingness to
provide new ideas and new products, it can also affect the tax evasion of
entrepreneurs.
2.4. Corruption and entrepreneurship
Corruption means abusive use of power to obtain personal gain (Rodriguez,
Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). Various forms of corruption can affect entrepreneurship,
especially broad and unpredictable corruption leads to increasing uncertainty in vari-
ous political, economic and social dimensions and reduces the incentive for invest-
ment. In addition, time, energy and resources that should be spent on productive
activities are being wasted for corrupt practices. According to Baumol (1996), one
can argue that there is a direct connection between the corrupt environments in a
particular country and a limited productive entrepreneurship. Therefore, countries
with high levels of corruption are expected to have low-level productive entrepreneur-
ship. Many studies have examined the effects of corruption on various economic fac-
tors and more recently on entrepreneurship (Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006; Mo, 2001).
A number of studies also found a negative effect of corruption on entrepreneurship
(Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; Dutta & Sobel, 2016), while other studies have not found
any direct effect at the national level (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2012).
Moreover, a number of studies have found positive effects of corruption on entre-
preneurship (Belitski et al., 2016; Chowdhury, Audretsch, & Belitski, 2015; Dreher &
Gassebner, 2013). In addition to the complex nature of the relationship between
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corruption and entrepreneurship, the difference in applied methodology (especially
cross-sectional data or inter-country panel or different entrepreneurial criteria) can
lead to a variety of outcomes.
Furthermore, various studies on entrepreneurship suggest that corruption can have
a non-linear effect on entrepreneurial activity (Aidis et al., 2012; Anokhin & Schulze,
2009; Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). However, corruption under different circumstances
can have a different effect on entrepreneurship. One of the factors that changes the
effect of corruption is how businesses are organised and the rules and regulations in
the business environment. The lack of transparency of laws, rigorous rules, and the
lack of flexibility and waste of resources can change the impact of corruption on
entrepreneurship, in such a situation, corruption can facilitate the establishment of
entrepreneurial activities (Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010). In the same
way, Avnimelech et al. (2014) found that countries with high levels of corruption are
facing low levels of entrepreneurship, and this effect is more vigorous in developed
countries than in developing countries.
Table 1 provides a summary of findings in 15 recent empirical studies of the
effects of corruption and tax evasion on various measures of entrepreneurship. The
summarised information suggests that three factors may have contributed to the
mixed evidence in empirical literature. First, different studies use different measures
of entrepreneurship (including nascent entrepreneurs, firm birth rates, and self-
employment). Second, some studies use macro (aggregated) data while others use
micro individual, firm, or industry data. Third, the samples used (developing and
panels of European countries), different periods, and methodologies (time series,
cross section, and panel estimations) that may have contributed to divergent conclu-
sions. In addition, many studies fail to address the potential endogeneity of corrup-
tion, tax evasion and entrepreneurship, which may also explain the different
conclusions in different studies. Therefore, the present study has three aspects of
innovation in relation to previous studies. First, the author has not studied the litera-
ture on the effect of tax evasion and corruption on various stages of entrepreneurship
activity. For the first time, the present study explores the long-run relationship
between tax evasion and corruption in different stages of entrepreneurial activity in
the sample of 36 OECD countries in the period of 2000–2010. Second, the long-term
relationship within the framework of cointegration is examined by which the poten-
tial simultaneity of the variables used in the model can be estimated using FMOLS
and DOLS, that been ignored in previous literature. Another important aspect of this
paper is distinguishing between the different stages of the formation of entrepreneur-
ial activity in accordance with the GEM Framework.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
As discussed previously, measuring entrepreneurship is not an easy task, as people
perceive entrepreneurship differently. Audretsch (1995) used the business ownership
rate as a proxy for the level of entrepreneurship. He also employed a measure of
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entrepreneurship that includes an indicator of R&D activity, the number of patented
inventions, and new product innovations introduced into the market.
According to GEM, an appropriate structure for entrepreneurship is presented as
follows; (1) Potential Entrepreneurs, Based on people’s beliefs and attitudes about
entrepreneurship; (2) Entrepreneurial Intention (INT): The percentage of people aged
18–64 who are planning a new business in the next 12months; (3) Total Early Stage
Table 1. Summary of selected empirical studies of the impact of corruption/tax evasion on
entrepreneurship.
Author Methodology




64 countries, macro data from GEM Better control of corruption will raise the
levels of innovation and entrepreneurship.
Avnimelech
et al. (2014)
70 less developed countries and 34
OECD countries, entrepreneurial
activity collected from the
professional networking
site LinkedIn
The negative effect of corruption on
entrepreneurship, which is more significant
in developed countries
Belitski et al. (2016) 72 countries, macro data from
World Bank
The direct influence of corruption on entry is
negative, the interaction influence of
corruption and tax rate is positive.
Corruption can offset the negative
influence of high taxes on entry.
Berdiev and
Saunoris (2018)




Regional panel dataset including 14
Czech NUTS III regions, utilise
data from Transparency
International and GEM
The estimated panel regressions empirically
support a hypothesis about the negative




Brazil, municipalities aggregate data
on number of business
establishments
Higher levels of corruption are generally








Corruption serving as both grease and sand
for nascent international entrepreneurship;
Corporate tax is not a significant deterrent
factor for IE when corruption is low.
Darnihamedani
et al. (2018)
53 countries, micro data using start-
up costs and taxes
The negative role of corporate tax rate on
innovative entrepreneurship
Djankov et al. (2010) 85 countries, Authors’ data,
collected from business registries
The negative role of corporate tax rate on
entrepreneurial activity
Dutta and Sobel (2016) Micro data for 130 company using
world bank data
Corruption never improves entrepreneurship;
it simply hurts less when business climates
are not conducive to growth in the
first place.
F€olster (2002) Sweden; micro data
self-employment
Negative correlation between the tax burden
and the share of self-employment
Jimenez and
Alon (2018)
93 countries, macro data using the
entry density rate from the
World Bank
Countries with higher levels of corruption are
associated with lower levels of
firm creation..








90 countries, Macro data using
GEM data




Micro data of World Business
Environment Surveys
(WBES 2000)
The ‘grabbing hands’ of corrupt bureaucrats
may serve as ‘helping hands’ allowing
firms to exploit profitable opportunities in
the unofficial sector. Incentives to evade
taxation and produce underground
depend on statutory tax rates relative to
firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration.
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entrepreneurship (TEA): All entrepreneurial activities that last for up to three and a
half years or 42months; (4) Established Entrepreneurship (ESP): All entrepreneurial
activities with a life span of more than 42months; and (5) Discontinuance (Exit): The
percentage of adults aged 18–64 who have been exited during the past 12months due
to reduced sales, closure or starting a new business (Kelley, Bosma, & Amoros, 2011).
Based on the above mentioned 5-step model, similar to Kelley, Singer and Herrington
(2012), I used entrepreneurial activities data in three different stages of entrepreneur-
ship activity (based on availability of data) including INT, TEA and ESP.
Furthermore, the GEM database has their limitations, because there are several
sources of errors (see e.g., Dvoulety, 2018) for a discussion. Therefore, the self-
employment rates (EMP) also obtained from the OECD database.
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has been extracted from the
Transparency International database. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranges
between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (very clean) for the years 1995–2011 and between
0 and 100 afterwards, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt
and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. Moreover, I eliminated all observations
for variable features that have a missing entry. After adjustments, the final sample
used in the empirical analysis (unbalanced panel) consists of 162 observations for the
benchmark model. Table 2 present summary statistics of the variables.
3.2. Sample selection
The sample of countries used in the present study is based on Buehn and Schneider
(2012), Australia, Ireland, Italy, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Using this sample of countries in this study is important in three respects. At first, due to
the high role of taxes in the economy of these countries, the existence of tax evasion
incentives due to different tax structures and different levels of corruption in most of these
countries. Secondly, there is a great deal of differences between INT, TEA and ESP in
these countries, which makes it easier to compare, and ultimately, since the series of tax
evasion data provided by Buehn and Schneider (2012) OECD has been completed and
stopped in 2010. Therefore, the analysis conducted between 2000 and 2010.
3.3. Panels co-integration tests
Pedroni (1999, 2001) proposed multiple coagulation tests for non-homogeneous panel
data, suggesting that these tests have fewer restrictions than homogeneous panel data
Table 2. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Entrepreneurial intentions 8.432 4.045 1.55 (Hungary) 21.35 (Latvia) 162
Total early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) 6.257 2.626 1.63 (France) 17.57 (New Zealand) 162
Established Business Ownership 6.3106 2.922 0.5 (Finland) 19.61 (Greece) 162
Self-employment 17.039 8.137 7.449 (Norway) 41.165 (Turkey) 162
Tax evasion 1.5197 0.491 0.6 (Switzerland) 2.9 (Slovenia) 162
Corruption 7.261 1.844 3.5 (Greece) 9.7 (Iceland) 162
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used in co-integration tests. Group tests for non-homogeneous panels based on an inter-
group approach, which consists of three group statistics, PP, rho and ADF. Homogeneous
panel co-integration tests are based on an intragroup approach that includes panel statis-
tics v, rho, PP and ADF. These four statistics combine auto-gradient coefficients between
different countries for unit root tests on estimated residues. Moreover, for large panel
data, it is difficult to consider the data homogeneity hypothesis. Therefore, unlike the Kao
test for completely homogeneous panel data, Pedroni tests allow cross-sectional correl-
ation with random effects and unbounded homogeneity assumptions.
For both tests, the following relationships are established:
yi, t ¼ yi, t1 þ #i, t
xi, t ¼ xi, t1 þ ei, t
The regression is then considered as follows:
yi, t ¼ ai, t þ bi, txi, t þ ui, t
Where, i ¼ 1, :::, N are the countries under review in the panel; t ¼ 1, :::, T Refers
to the period of analysis, ai, t Constant sentences are individual; bi, t the slope param-
eter (which is considered homogeneous in the case of the Kao tests (1999)); ei, t and
#i, t stationary disturbance terms and so yi, t and xi, t for all (i), are I (1).
The null hypothesis of the lack of co-integration (qi ¼ 1) was tested using unit
root test on the residuals of the model as follows:
INTi, t ¼ ai, t þ b1, iTAX þ b2, iCORþ ui, t
TEAi, t ¼ ai, t þ b1, iTAX þ b2, iCORþ ui, t
ESPi, t ¼ ai, t þ b1, iTAX þ b2, iCORþ ui, t
EMPi, t ¼ ai, t þ b1, iTAX þ b2, iCORþ ui, t
Where, INT, entrepreneurial intention; TEA, total entrepreneurial activity; ESP,
established entrepreneurship, EMP, self-employment, TAX, tax evasion level, COR,
corruption level and ui, t is error term.
3.4. Long-term relationship based on FMOLS and DOLS
The Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) method has been formulated by Saikkonen
(1991), Stock and Watson (1993) to estimate long-run equilibrium coefficients in cointe-
grated systems of higher orders. In the literature, different estimation methods for panel
cointegration models are proposed. However, the OLS estimator is consistent with the
panel cointegration, but it has second-degree asymptotic bias. Therefore, estimates of
FMOLS and DOLS techniques are designed. The DOLS approach copes well with small-
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sample bias, simultaneity bias within regressors due to the inclusion of lagged, and leading
first differences of regressors, in turn resolving potential endogeneity issues. According to
Chen, McCoskey & Koa (1999), the DOLS parametric approach is computationally con-
venient and is preferred over the FMOLS method and the bias-correction technique for t-
statistics and OLS estimators. In order to estimate the LR co-integrating vectors. Contrary
to the Johansen method, which uses the Maximum Likelihood estimation method and
constitutes a full information technique, the DOLS is not liable to the propagation of par-
ameter misspecification in underlying equations.
Pedroni (2001) shows that the panel estimates of FMOLS and DOLS that suggested
by Kao have a serious bias due to the small sample size. Thus, he shows that the
group means panel estimator integrates between-dimension data and leads to rela-
tively small deviations in small samples. In addition, by developing the work of Kao
and Chiang (2000), Pedroni proposes a between-dimension and group-mean panel
DOLS that includes the correction and elimination of endogeneity issues and serial
correlations parametrically. In this study, I used two estimating groups for stability
and sensitivity analysis of the model. Consequently, after writing the co-integration
relationship, first, according to Pedroni (2001), the nonparametric FMOLS for non-
homogeneous accumulated panels estimated. The DOLS estimator of the averaging
panel is as follows:
INTi, t ¼ ai, t þ b1, iTAXi, t þ
Xk¼ki
k¼ki c1, ikDTAXi, t þ b2, iCORi, t
þ
Xk¼ki
k¼ki c2, ikDCORi, t þ ui, t
(1)
TEAi, t ¼ ai, t þ b1, iTAXi, t þ
Xk¼ki
k¼ki c1, ikDTAXi, t þ b2, iCORi, t
þ
Xk¼ki
k¼ki c2, ikDCORi, t þ ui, t
(2)
ESPi, t ¼ ai, t þ b1, iTAXi, t þ
Xk¼ki
k¼ki c1, ikDTAXi, t þ b2, iCORi, t
þ
Xk¼ki
k¼ki c2, ikDCORi, t þ ui, t
(3)
EMPi, t ¼ ai, t þ b1, iTAXi, t þ
Xk¼ki
k¼ki c1, ikDTAXi, t þ b2, iCORi, t
þ
Xk¼ki
k¼ki c2, ikDCORi, t þ ui, t
(4)
4. Empirical findings
As an initial step, the integration of properties of the variables is determined by using
the various panel unit root tests. Table 3 presents the outcomes. Except for the Levin,
Lin, and Chu (2002) test, all other tests indicate the existence of a single root at the
level of variables, and this implies that the variables are I (1). However, asymptotic
features of all these tests require large N and T. In addition, all tests are based on the
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strong assumption of the independence of sectional units. Taking into account the
above considerations, the majority of the unit root results clearly reveal that while the
variables seem non-stationary at the level, the first differences of the variables appear
to be stationary, indicating that the integration of properties of the variables is (I(1)).
After detecting non-stationarity with panel unit root tests, the Pedroni and Kao
cointegration tests proceeded to investigate whether any long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship exists between entrepreneurship variables (TEA, INT ESP and EMP), COR,
and TAX by applying the Pedroni (2001, 2004) and Kao (1999) panel cointegration
procedure and by allowing heterogeneity. Table 4 reports the results of the panel
cointegration tests for the models in Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4), respectively.
As can be seen from Table 4, the two of four Pedronis’ tests (1999, 2001) indicate
that there is a cointegration relationship for INT, TEA and ESP Models. The Kao test
(1999) also indicates a cointegration relationship. However, the non-homogeneous
panel hypothesis is more logical and more likely; meaning that the majority of the
statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in all models. This indicates
the existence of a long-run relationship among the variables in all cases. Based on the
purpose of this study, once the properties of all variables are co-integrated in all
models, the next step is to implement the FMOLS and DOLS tests in order to investi-
gate the long-run linkage among the country entrepreneurship variables, tax evasion
and corruption. Table 5 reported the estimates of the co-integrating relationship.
The coefficients of corruption are statistically significant in three models, suggest-
ing that the effect of corruption on entrepreneurial activities is negative, as expected.
In other words, corruption in OECD countries decreases the levels of entrepreneurial
activities in the long run. In explaining this phenomenon, it can be said that bureau-
cratic economic corruption, by absorbing part of the production revenues reduce the
profitability of companies and established businesses, which in turn undermines
incentives and entrepreneurial activities. In addition, corruption is an obstacle to cre-
ating innovation and recognising entrepreneurial opportunities. Moreover, having a
more and more corruption that leads to bigger informal sector is likely to move the
country’s entrepreneurial activities into a more fragile environment in the long run.
This empirical observation supports the stated hypothesis suggesting that higher cor-
ruption perceptions were negatively associated with the entrepreneurial activity. The
Table 3. Panel unit root test.
Variable Levin, Lin and Chu Im, Pesaran and Shin Fisher—ADF Fisher—PP
Level TEA 2.66 0.75 46.32 100.26
ESP 0.52 1.23 54.34 124.47
INT 6.24 1.43 49.65 75.03
EMP 5.13 1.11 37.64 54.17
COR 0.96 0.64 36.48 60.15
TAX 4.13 0.61 24.18 9.92
First Difference DTEA 9.84 4.32 89.36 171.32
DESP 13.43 6.05 114.12 205.62
DINT 26.65 11.87 120.46 140.32
DEMP 10.13 4.01 98.17 125.23
DCOR 4.81 1.34 53.16 158.02
DTAX 5.65 – 57.31 80.36
Note: , , and  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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obtained finding is also in line with the recent empirical observations of the leading
scholars (e.g., Aidis et al., 2012; Belitski et al., 2016; Boudreaux, Nikolaev, &
Holcombe, 2018; Chowdhury, Audretsch, et al., 2015; Dutta & Sobel, 2016), who con-
clusively claim that corruption may never be good for entrepreneurship.
In the case of tax evasion, the outcomes from the panel FMOLS and DOLS estima-
tors reveal that tax evasion is negatively affect the TEA and established entrepreneur-
ial activities. However, it was surprising to find a long-run effect from tax evasion on
entrepreneurial motivation. However, this result is consistent with findings of Block
(2016), Braunerhjelm and Eklund (2014), and Asoni and Sanandaji (2014). On the
one hand, tax evasion combined with tax avoidance can be considered as a tax haven
for reducing tax burdens. This encourages self-employment (entrepreneurship), and
therefore has a positive impact on entrepreneurial motivation. This may happen
because of an increase in tax evasion, which encourages people to start a business
without engaging in corrupt practices, although their risk aversion may decrease in
this regard. On the other hand, the existence of tax evasion in a country itself is indi-
cative of the high level of underground economy, the high corruption environment
and high income tax rates, which, as a rule, have a negative impact on entrepreneur-
ial activities. However, if entrepreneurs do not pay taxes, they may benefit in the
short run, but in the long run, a tax breaks created by tax evasion will lead to an
increase in tax levels and severe controls on business and established entrepreneurial
activities. These outcomes will have a negative impact on entrepreneurial activities.
Similarly, tax evasion and corruption have negatively affects self-employment activ-
ities. These results confirmed the findings of studies that have obtained the harmful
effect of corruption on self-employment engagement (e.g., Boudreaux et al., 2018;
Dutta & Sobel, 2016). Furthermore, according to the results of both the FMOLS and
DOLS estimators, it can be said that the level of corruption and tax evasion have a
stronger effect on the level of established entrepreneurial activity relative to the TEA
and entrepreneurial motivation. This can be explained by the fact that if there is a
corrupt business environment, high level of underground economy and subsequently
a high tax evasion; so, the rate of business failure will be very high in the early years
of starting the business. As a result, the volume of established entrepreneurial activ-
ities would more affect. Finally, according to the results, in contrast to tax evasion,
corruption seems to have a more negative impact on entrepreneurship. Given the fact
that the entrepreneurs are people who take risks at the start of the business, if they
realise that competitors have earned some advantage or income due to tax evasion,
they probably following their competitors, do not pay taxes. However, the situation is
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somewhat different in the case of corruption. It seems that entrepreneurs do not have
the financial resources to pay bribes to gain advantage or because they have an
inaccurate understanding of corruption, they see corruptions in relation to adminis-
trative bureaucracy or market uncertainty.
5. Robustness checks
As there might be significant differences across continents, thus in order to have
more reliable conclusions about the relationship between the variables, in this section,
I focus only on a limited region (i.e., a continent or a specific area within the contin-
ent) so that the geographical area is more precise. Then, I cluster countries in three
groups: (1) European OECD countries, (2) American OECD countries and (3) Asian
OECD countries, to identify whether we can detect subtle variations in variables
effects (Table 6).
In European-OECD countries, corruption apparently has a negative effect on TEA,
established entrepreneurship and self-employment rates (see Table 6). Similarly, the
presence of tax evasion apparently negatively affects the entrepreneurial intentions,
TEA, established and self-employment rates.
Among American-OECD economies, corruption negatively affects entrepreneurial
intention and TEA rates (see Table 6). Similarly, the amount of tax evasion negatively
influences entrepreneurial intention, TEA, established and self-employment rates.
Among Asian-OECD countries, surprisingly the results indicate that corruption
has no significant impact on different stages of entrepreneurial activities and similarly
on self-employment rates. Furthermore, the impact of tax evasion on entrepreneurial
intention, TEA and self-employment rates are positive. This is surprising given that
prior research argues the importance of control of corruption and tax evasion in
increasing entrepreneurial activity. It is worth noting that the differences in results
compare to results of Table 5, come from geographically diversion of countries, the
different behaviour of countries in terms of the entrepreneurial activities, dealing
with tax evasion and control of corruption in these countries.
6. Conclusion
Little research has investigated the intersection of the entrepreneurial activities, cor-
ruption and tax evasion. This study responds to this issue by exploring how corrup-
tion and tax evasion simultaneously influence entrepreneurial activity in OECD
countries. To the author’s knowledge, however, no previous studies have explicitly
examined the linkage among the tax evasion, corruption, and entrepreneurship stages
variables by using the same dataset. The present article fills this gap for 31 OECD
countries. The study uses the corruption perception Index (CPI) from Transparency
International, tax evasion dataset from Buehn and Schneider (2012), entrepreneurship
data from the GEM database, and self-employment data from World Bank database.
Based on this perspective, the Pedroni and Kao cointegration test, FMOLS and DOLS
tests were performed. The findings bring to light powerful evidence that (1) corrup-
tion has a negative impact on all three stages of entrepreneurial motivation, total
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entrepreneurship activity and established entrepreneurship, and (2) tax evasion has a
negative effect on the TEA and established entrepreneurship, while it has a positive
impact on the entrepreneurial motivation. Overall, this study empirically extends the
discussion about the importance of the corruption and tax evasion in fostering entre-
preneurial activity, while calling attention to the differential aspect of region’s diver-
sity of countries on different stages of entrepreneurial activity. As a result, these
findings reveal some important policy recommendations for policymakers in the
OECD countries studied. First, according to the effect of government tax policies on
entrepreneurial activities in a country, it is important to determine and enforce the
appropriate tax rate by governments. It should be a priority for policy makers,
because, with the excessive increase in tax rates, business managers have to pay more
taxes, which can discourage business owners (especially for new and TEA entrepre-
neurs) (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2015). In this regard, it can be said that tax evasion in any
cases is problematic because firms can temporarily reduce their costs through tax eva-
sion and gain unfair competitive advantage over their competitors (Tonoyan et al.,
2010). Second, in a highly corrupt business environment, the tax morale may be low,
and individuals may not be able to trust government’s ability to manage taxes to pro-
vide public services, and thus this distrust could lead to tax evasion and making it
more attractive (Aidis et al., 2012; Estrin, Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013).
Therefore, the governors in the OECD countries, when trying to reduce tax evasion,
must simultaneously adopt policies to combat corruption. In other words, in order to
promote entrepreneurial activities, both tax evasion and corruption must be eradi-
cated. Third, given that newly established firms are usually small businesses, both
because of the risk of failure and because of more opportunities to engage in tax eva-
sion and lower tax morale, they considered as a high-risk group in terms of Tax com-
pliance (Torgler, 2007). Therefore, government tax policies and anti-corruption
strategies should be more sensitive to these types of entrepreneurs. Additionally, if
policymakers in the OECD countries hope to building trust in society and boosting
entrepreneurship in the long run; then their attention should be focussed on flexibil-
ity, deterrence and transparency in the business regulations and laws, so that entre-
preneurs do not need to give bribes to start their businesses, and reduce the amount
of tax evasion. Although the present study makes it possible to identify strong empir-
ical findings, further studies should be conducted in different regions of the world. In
addition, using the subcategories of entrepreneurial activities (such as opportunity,
necessary, nascent, formal and informal entrepreneurship) variables, further research
should focus on the relationship between tax evasion, corruption and entrepreneur-
ial activities.
It is worth noting that the limitations in this research can be related to the model
used and the results of the research. The first limitation is related to the model esti-
mation results. These results are only valid for the countries studied and may be valid
only in the period under consideration. Thus, in the presence of other variables
affecting the level of entrepreneurial activities, as well as the wider period or the sam-
ple of other countries, the estimated results may change. The second limitation is the
scarcity of data, in other words, insufficient information on tax evasion over a longer
period. Furthermore, the research was undertaken using a relatively small sample of
3642 M. MOHAMMADI KHYAREH
countries in America and Asia region. Thus, the study needs to replicate in a range
of different countries, in order to test the generality and generalizability of the sub-
stantive results. However, it is suggested to other researchers that in future studies,
consider other subgroups of entrepreneurs in terms of gender or in terms of formal
and informal entrepreneurs or innovative, nascent, opportunity or necessary
entrepreneurs.
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